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The Common European Asylum System calls for increased coordination of
the EU countries’ policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. In this paper,
we provide a formal analysis of the eﬀects of coordination, explicitly modelling
the democratic process through which policy is determined. In a symmetric,
two-country citizen-candidate setup, in which accepting asylum seekers in one
country generates a cross-border externality in the other, we show that coordi-
nation is desirable. Internalizing the externality leads to a welfare improvement
over the non–cooperative outcome. However, contrary to suggestions by many
observers, we show that allowing for cross-country transfers in the cooperative
outcome leads to a welfare inferior outcome because the possibility of compen-
sation exacerbates strategic delegation eﬀects.
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Since the 1970’s the EU has removed formal barriers to the internal mobility of
production factors. At the same time, member countries have continued to follow
autonomous policies towards immigration from the rest of the world. The ‘Single
European Act’, which established the Single Market, went as far as explicitly speci-
fying that “nothing in these provisions shall aﬀect the right of member states to take
measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of controlling immigration from
third countries.”1
Retaining control over immigration policy is of utmost political concern to most
countries. Indeed, as recent Eurobarometer surveys show, a majority of EU citizens
consistently opposes the idea of delegating authority over the issue to Brussels,2 and
the successful anti-immigration campaigns of a Pim Fortuyn or J¨ org Haider only
conﬁrm the importance of this policy dimension. At the same time, the eﬀorts towards
the creation of a pan-European labor market and the removal of border controls
between EU countries have made it diﬃcult to enforce limits on the mobility of
third country nationals within the EU. Furthermore, there is a serious risk of under-
provision of border controls by those EU member countries that are not likely to be
the ﬁnal destination of immigration ﬂows.3 For these reasons, many observers have
suggested that coordinating migration policies might actually be desirable.4
While the EU is far from having a common immigration policy, the debate has
led to the adoption of a series of initiatives aimed at increasing the coordination
of the actions of the member countries (Schengen accords), but with only limited
impact on the integration of labor markets. A more substantial step is the proposed
establishment of a Common European Asylum System. This initiative has so far led
to two directives, spelling out a precise deﬁnition of refugees, as well as some minimum
standards concerning the status of refugees as well as asylum procedures and reception
1General Declaration on Articles 13 to 19.
2See Luedtke (2005).
3“Switzerland and Austria have accused Italy of turning a blind eye to would–be refugees heading
north.” The Economist, September 6 2001.
4See for instance Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002), Hatton and Williamson (2004), and
Hatton (2004).
1conditions for asylum seekers. Many observers suggest that these ﬁrst steps are not
suﬃcient, and recommend a more substantial eﬀort towards further coordination.
For instance, Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002) propose to “... coordinate the
implementation of the rules, and share the costs of humanitarian migration equally,
for example by a fund for asylum seekers, refugees and other humanitarian migrants.5
This will internalize costs and prevent countries with more generous policies from
being penalized.”
While standard welfare economics seems to support this idea, the purpose of
our paper is to address the desirability of coordination when the democratic process
through which migration policies are decided is explicitly taken into account. To
this end, we develop a symmetric, two–country model in which an inﬂow of foreign-
ers in one country gives rise to a positive externality on the residents of the other.
Policy is determined through a two–stage process: In the ﬁrst stage, citizens elect a
representative, while in the second stage the representatives determine immigration
policy.6 We compare the outcome without coordination to two possible scenarios in
which countries cooperate: In the ﬁrst, no transfer payments between countries are
possible, whereas in the second transfer payments are possible, as has been suggested
in the recent debate.
We ﬁnd for both scenarios that taking into account the democratic process does
not alter the main conclusion that there are gains from policy coordination. However,
because of strategic delegation, the utilitarian optimum is not achieved. Interestingly,
allowing for transfers between countries leads to an outcome which is inferior to the
situation without transfers. The intuition for this result is that the possibility of direct
cost sharing will exacerbate the strategic delegation emerging in the political game,
implying an ineﬃciently low level of immigration. From a normative perspective,
our analysis suggests that while some coordination might be desirable, very pervasive
approaches can lead to less attractive outcomes. With asymmetric preferences for
5Emphasis added by the authors.
6The citizen-candidate framework we are using has been introduced by Besley and Coate (1997)
and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). The concept of strategic delegation has been applied in diﬀerent
contexts: Besley and Coate (2003) use it to analyze the provision of local public goods, Willmann
(2004) employs it to endogenize trade policy, Lorz and Willmann (2005) explain the degree of
regionalism in this way, etc.
2immigration, we show the additional presence of the usual beneﬁcial role of side-
payments as they allow an eﬃcient allocation of asylum seekers.
The existing literature on policy towards asylum seekers has emphasized the risk
of a ‘race to the bottom’, i.e. a tendency for those countries with more generous pro-
visions towards refugees to adopt more restrictive policies in order to avoid becoming
asylum magnets. Noll (2000) has even talked of a ‘common market of deﬂection’
within the European Union. While the issue has spurred a lively debate in the media,
it has attracted relatively little formal analysis. In two recent papers, Hatton (2004)
and Hatton and Williamson (2004) have developed a formal framework that high-
lights how policy coordination might be desirable from the point of view of welfare
maximization. The key driving force behind their results is the existence of posi-
tive spill-overs between countries, rather than the internalization of deﬂection eﬀects.
Our analysis also emphasizes the public good nature of public policy towards asylum
seekers; however, we move beyond simple welfare maximization and model explicitly
the role of the democratic process in shaping policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent de-
velopments in the inﬂows of asylum seekers in the EU and the policy stances adopted
by the member countries. We then introduce the model used for our analysis and
discuss the social planner solution as a benchmark case against which to evaluate the
endogenous policy outcomes. In Section 4, we determine the endogenous migration
policy adopted when countries do not cooperate. The outcome with coordination is
discussed in Section 5, where we consider ﬁrst the situation without transfers between
countries, and subsequently allow for explicit cost sharing. Section 6 explores the case
of asymmetric preferences for asylum seekers before we oﬀer concluding remarks in
Section 7.
2 Asylum seekers and policies
In 2002, about two thirds of all asylum applications in the western world were directed
at the EU–15 member countries (UNHCR (2003)). The number of asylum seekers
trying to enter the EU–15 has increased dramatically over the past twenty years,
3Figure 1: Asylum applications approval. (Source: Eurostat)
peaking in the aftermath of the fall of the iron curtain at around 700,000 in 1992. By
2002, a little over 400,000 applications were ﬁled, a ﬁgure that is still more than twice
as high as the level of the 1980’s (see Figure 1). Notwithstanding these ﬂuctuations
in the ﬂow of asylum seekers, the number of applications that were actually accepted
based on the Geneva convention has remained relatively stable at around 38,000 a
year, while the number of refugees admitted on humanitarian grounds has increased
substantially over the period, accounting for about half of the total admissions in 2002.
The main message that emerges from Figure 1 is that while the number of applications
has experienced a substantial upward trend, the number of positive decisions has not
increased proportionally, implying that policy towards asylum seekers has become
more restrictive over time. What lies behind this development?
We can distinguish two components of a EU country’s policy towards asylum seek-
ers: a supra-national component and a national one. The supra-national dimension
is due to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The document,
agreed upon in 1951, deﬁnes a refugee as someone who is outside his country of origin,
and is unable or unwilling to return to it (Art. 1). It also establishes the principle
4of non refoulement, which means that the refugee cannot be forcibly returned to the
frontier of a territory where her life or freedom would be threatened (Art. 33). By
1978, all EU-15 members had ratiﬁed the Geneva convention and this agreement rep-
resents the basic legal foundation of the EU’s policy towards asylum seekers. The
growing number of refugees during the eighties led to an eﬀort to harmonize the rules
and the policies followed by member states. Particular emphasis was put on the har-
monization of visa policies and the establishment of sanctions against carriers that
illegally transport refugees. In 1990, the Dublin Convention sought to put an end
to the so called ‘asylum shopping’ phenomenon, decreeing that the application for
asylum should be dealt with by one state only, usually the state of ﬁrst entry. The
subsequent London resolution established a series of important, though non–binding
principles: First the concept of a ‘safe third country’, allowing refusal of admission
if the refugee had gone through a safe third country. Second, ‘manifestly unfounded’
claims could be rejected without the right to appeal. Third, a list of ‘safe countries
of origin’ was drawn up, with the presumption that no serious risk would be incurred
by the claimant were she to be expelled and repatriated to a country on that list.
The most recent developments stem from the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere
1999 European Council. Consequently, as of 2002, the EU Commission has the sole
right to propose legislation and two further directives were adopted: The ﬁrst one,
introduced in March 2003, speciﬁes ‘Minimum standards for the qualiﬁcations and
the status of asylum seekers in the EU’ and the second, adopted in April 2004, deals
with ‘Minimum standards for the qualiﬁcations and status of third country nationals
and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international pro-
tection’. The intention has been to increase the coordination of the policies pursued
by the various EU–15 countries. Along the same lines, a European Refugee Fund was
established in 2000. Endowed with 216 million Euros for the period 2000–2004, the
fund aims at providing ﬁnancial support to help the member states receive asylum
seekers, refugees and displaced persons.
Table 2, taken from Hatton (2004), gives us an idea of the evolution of the policy
towards asylum seekers followed by each of the EU–15 countries. The indeces we
report are intended to capture changes of the respective policies. A value of 1 indi-
5Access Procedure Outcomes Conditions
index index index index
Austria 1.43 1.46 1.9 1.57
Belgium 0.47 2.4 1.86 1.6
Denmark 1 2.5 1.9 2
Finland 1 2.3 1.68 1.16
France 1.48 1.33 1.8 1.48
Germany 1.65 1.95 1.8 2.1
Greece 0 1.25 1.9 2.8
Ireland 0.2 0.53 0.7 0.96
Italy 1.92 1.92 0.5 1.72
Netherlands 1.02 1.57 1.53 1.7
Portugal 1 1.13 1.62 2
Spain 1.58 1.08 1.69 2
Sweden 1 1.74 2.48 1.1
UK 1 1.8 1.02 2.09
Table 1: Changes in asylum policies 1990–1999. (Source: Hatton (2004))
cates the introduction of a more restrictive policy, whereas a value of 0 means that
no major change was introduced that year. Each ‘policy’ stance involves multiple
possible dimensions. For instance, in the construction of the procedure index Hatton
(2004) considered the introduction of ‘safe third country’ provisions, rules concern-
ing ‘manifestly unfounded claims’ and ‘fast track procedures’.7 The reported indeces
are averages over the 1990–1999 period. While the construction of these indicators
necessarily involves some arbitrariness, the main message is clear: All countries have
moved towards more restrictive policies, with the possible exception of Ireland, where
the government’s attitude seems not to have changed much.
Even though the policy stance adopted by the various countries has moved in
the same direction and a substantial eﬀort has been profused towards coordinating
policies, when it comes to the actual acceptance of asylum seekers, we see from Figure
2 that there are still considerable diﬀerences across countries. The data are taken
from Eurostat and represent the share of all asylum seeking applications that are
accepted. As we can see, the Northern countries (Sweden and Finland, in particular,
7For more details on the construction of the ﬁgures, we refer the reader to the Appendix of Hatton
(2004).
6Figure 2: Asylum applications approval. (Source: Eurostat)
and to a lesser extent Denmark) seem to be much more receptive than Belgium, Italy,
or Austria. While there may be many reasons behind these diﬀerences, it is fair to
say that the eﬀorts at coordinating asylum policy undertaken so far have produced
only very limited results. In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss to what
extent policy coordination is desirable, once due attention is paid to the democratic
process that determines such policies.
3 The Model
We consider two symmetric countries, indexed by i ∈ {1,2}. Each country is popu-
lated by a continuum of citizens, and we normalize the mass of each population to
one. Refugees coming from the rest of the world can be admitted into either coun-
try. We denote by mi the number of asylum seekers allowed into country i. Note
that, due to the above normalization, mi ∈ (0,1) indicates the number of asylum
seekers as a fraction of the domestic population. Country i controls the access to its
territory and can therefore choose mi; similarly the other country determines m−i.
7Let the vector m = (m1,m2) summarize the policies followed by the two countries.
The residents of country i derive an altruistic beneﬁt from admitting refugees into
either country. We denote this beneﬁt by Bi(
P
j mj) and note that it depends on
the total number admitted into both countries. The same eﬀect has been pointed
out by Hatton and Williamson (2004). It captures the warm glow of helping refugees
to avoid their plight elsewhere and enjoy safe haven in either country. Clearly, there
are also costs from admitting asylum seekers which we denote by Ci(mi,m−i). In
the interest of tractability, we assume that the beneﬁt to country i takes the form
Bi = (1 + α)
P
j mj and that the cost amounts to Ci = −ln(1 − λmi − [1 − λ]m−i),
where 1/2 < λ < 1.8 While the cost to country i is primarily determined by the
number of refugees it accepts (mi), we do allow for cost spill-overs from the inﬂow
(m−i) into the other country.9 These spill-overs can, for example, be due to a perme-
able, imperfectly controlled interior border between the two countries. In this case λ
should be thought of as the fraction of immigrants admitted by country i who choose
country i as their ﬁnal destination, whereas 1 − λ is the fraction of the immigrants
admitted by country i who end up moving to the other country.10 In addition to
this interpretation, our formulation also allows us to capture pecuniary spill-overs,
for example, from wage eﬀects in one country’s labor market onto the other’s due to
the free mobility of native workers between the two countries member of the EU.
Following these assumptions, the utility of individual αi in country i takes the
following form:
Ui(αi,m) = [1 + αi][mi + m−i] + ln(1 − λmi − [1 − λ]m−i) , (1)
where αi represents the strength of the individual’s altruistic preference for admit-
8It is worth emphasizing that the speciﬁc functional forms are chosen solely to guarantee a closed-
form solution. The crucial features of this setup are the convex cost that gives rise to a concave
objective function and the positive net spill-over from admitting asylum seekers. A similar functional
form is used by Segendorﬀ (1998).
9Conceptionally, we can distinguish up-front processing costs and the ongoing cost burden. While
our model allows for both, the inclusion of spill-overs is relevant mainly for the latter.
10Notice that in our model we do not explicitly consider the dynamic adjustments involved in
the ‘relocation’ of migrants across countries. This is realistic as long as the relocation takes place
quickly. Alternatively, as suggested by one referee, we could think of mi as representing the stock
of refugees, and the costs and utilities should then be interpreted as present values.
8ting refugees. We assume that citizens within both countries diﬀer with respect to
this preference term, i.e. in either country αi follows the same well-behaved density
function with mean and median ¯ α.
As a normative benchmark for our analysis, we start by deriving the values for
mi and m−i that maximize the combined welfare of both countries. This is the policy
vector a social planner who weighs the utility of all individuals in both countries
equally would set.11 Thus, we are seeking the solution to the following problem:
max
m1,m2
W = U1(¯ α,m) + U2(¯ α,m) . (2)
The corresponding ﬁrst order conditions are:
2 + 2¯ α −
λ
1 − λmi − [1 − λ]m−i
−
1 − λ
1 − λm−i − [1 − λ]mi
= 0 . (3)
Taken together, the ﬁrst order conditions of both countries imply that the number




i (¯ α) =
1 + 2¯ α
2 + 2¯ α
, (4)
the level of immigration that maximizes utilitarian social welfare. This is the level
that we will use as a reference point to determine the welfare properties of the political
equilibria we will examine next.
4 Immigration Levels without Coordination
In this section, we consider the scenario where each country determines the number
of refugees to admit non-cooperatively. Within each country, the decision is taken
following a two-stage political process. In the ﬁrst stage, citizens elect a representa-
tive. In the second stage, each region’s representative decides on the level of refugees
to admit, mi, taking the level in the other region, m−i, as given. Both representatives
11Note that the welfare of immigrants enters aggregate welfare in each country only indirectly
through the warm glow eﬀect.
9are assumed to be citizen-candidates in the sense of having the personal preferences
of an ordinary citizen. That is, the representative of region i has a preference ˆ αi for
immigration, and the vector ˆ α represents the preference proﬁle of the representatives
in the two regions. In the remainder of the paper we will use ‘hats’ to indicate the
preferences of representatives. In order to look for the non-cooperative outcome we
solve the game backwards. That is, we start by analyzing ﬁrst the second stage, where
the representative chooses the number of refugees. Taking the identity of represen-
tative i as given (for the time being), the ﬁrst order condition of her maximization
problem takes the following form:
1 + ˆ αi −
λ
1 − λmi − [1 − λ]m−i
= 0 . (5)
Solving this equation for mi, we obtain the reaction function of each representative:
mi =
1 + ˆ αi − λ





As can be seen from the coeﬃcient in front of m−i, the immigration levels are strategic
substitutes. In other words, the higher the number of asylum seekers admitted by the
other country, the lower is the number of refugees country i decides to accept, because
country i’s representative already beneﬁts from the refugees the other country lets
in. Solving for the Nash equilibrium, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium immigration levels
mN
i (ˆ α) are given by:
m
N
i (ˆ α) =
λ[1 + ˆ αi − λ]
[2λ − 1][1 + ˆ αi]
−
[1 − λ][1 + ˆ α−i − λ]
[2λ − 1][1 + ˆ α−i]
. (7)
Note that these non-cooperative levels depend on the identity of both representatives.
Straightforward comparative statics reveals that an increase in ˆ αi raises the immigra-







[1 + ˆ αi]
2 [2λ − 1]






[1 + ˆ αi]
2 [2λ − 1]
< 0 . (9)
The eﬀect of the own representative is intuitively clear: the more inclined is the
representative towards immigration, the more refugees she admits. The negative
eﬀect of the other country’s represenative stems from the own eﬀect and the strategic
substitutability that we established above. In a symmetric equilibrium with both
representatives having the same preference, equation (7) simpliﬁes to
m
N
i (ˆ α) =
1 + ˆ αi − λ
1 + ˆ αi
for ˆ αi = ˆ α−i . (10)
We are now ready to analyze the ﬁrst stage of the game, taking into account
what we already know about the second stage. The citizens in each country elect
their representative so as to maximize their utility imputation Ui(αi,mN(ˆ α)), where














i /dˆ αi + [1 − λ]dmN
−i/dˆ αi
1 − λmi(ˆ α) − [1 − λ]m−i(ˆ α)
= 0 . (11)
Inserting for dmN
i /dˆ αi, dmN
−i/dˆ αi, mi(ˆ α), and m−i(ˆ α) from above, and focusing on a
symmetric solution (i.e. ˆ αi = ˆ α−i), we can rewrite (11) as follows:
αi − ˆ αi





Since the right hand side is positive, because λ < 1, we see that each voter prefers a
representative with a lower preference for immigration than she has herself, i.e. ˆ αi <
αi. This holds a fortiori for the median voter who determines the election outcome.
The median voter with αi = ¯ α strategically delegates to a representative with ˆ αi < ¯ α.
12Recall that we assume 1/2 < λ < 1.
11In other words, the elected representatives in equilibrium have a lower preference
for immigration ˆ αN
i than the respective median. We have therefore established the
following result:







i (¯ α) < m
U
i (¯ α). (13)
As it turns out, the number of refugees accepted in the non-cooperative equilibrium
is suboptimally low for two reasons: First, because the net positive spill-overs are not
internalized. Second, because the median voter strategically delegates to someone
with a lower preference for immigration.13
5 Policy Coordination
We now turn our attention to the case where the two countries cooperate. Again,
we envisage a two-stage political process, similar to the one in the previous section,
only that now the two representatives cooperatively choose the migration vector into
either country in the second stage. This approach is intended to provide a stylized
model of the Common European Asylum System. We distinguish further between
the case in which transfers between countries are not permitted and the case in which
cost sharing is instead allowed. We begin by discussing the former case, while the
analysis of the latter is conducted in the second subsection.
5.1 Without Cost Sharing
Consider the case in which the two representatives cooperatively decide on the mi-
gration levels and the cost of the policy is borne by each country without the pos-
sibility of side-payments. We model coordination by assuming that in the second
13Note that in the absence of cost spill-overs (λ = 1) strategic delegation would disappear in the
non-cooperative game. This is not true in the coordination case because there strategic delegation
is undertaken for diﬀerent reasons, as will become clear in the next section.
12stage the two representatives engage in a Nash-bargaining game. They seek to max-
imize the Nash-product N = s1 · s2, where the surplus from bargaining si is given
by si = [1 + ˆ αi][mi + m−i] + ln(1 − λmi − [1 − λ]m−i) − Ui(ˆ αi,mN(ˆ αN)) and where
Ui(ˆ αi,mN(ˆ αN)) in turn denotes the outside utility of representative i if no agree-
ment is reached. In other words, if this happens we assume that the non-cooperative
migration levels of the previous section are implemented.14
The maximization of the Nash-product yields the following ﬁrst order conditions:
￿
1 + ˆ αi −
λ




1 + ˆ α−i −
1 − λ
1 − λm−i − [1 − λ]mi
￿
si = 0 . (14)
These ﬁrst order conditions implicitly determine the immigration levels in the bar-
gaining equilibrium without side-payments, mB
i (ˆ α) and mB
−i(ˆ α), as functions of the
identity of the two representatives. Focusing again on a symmetric equilibrium where
both representatives have the same preference for immigration, we obtain from (14)
that mB
1 = mB
2 and in particular:
m
B
i (ˆ α) =
1 + 2ˆ αi
2 + 2ˆ αi
for ˆ αi = ˆ α−i . (15)
Note that this solution resembles the utilitarian optimum of section 3. However, ˆ αi
may well diﬀer from the preference parameter ¯ α of the average citizen. To derive the
equilibrium ˆ αi we now turn to the election stage of the model. As in the previous
section, each voter in country i choses ˆ αi to maximize Ui(αi,mB(ˆ α)), with mB
i (ˆ α)
and mB
−i(ˆ α) determined implicitly by equation (14) above. The ﬁrst-order condition













i /dˆ αi + [1 − λ]dmB
−i/dˆ αi
1 − λmB
i (ˆ α) − [1 − λ]mB
−i(ˆ α)
= 0 . (16)
14The outside utility thus takes the form Ui(ˆ αi,mN) = 2[1 + ˆ αi]mN
i (ˆ αN)+ln(1−mN
i (ˆ αN)) where
mN
i (ˆ αN) is determined by the equilibrium without coordination derived in the previous section. Note
that this implies that the representatives who bargain are not necessarily the same as those who set
the immigration level non-cooperatively. We make this assumption to keep the model tractable.
13With symmetry (ˆ αi = ˆ α−i), the marginal inﬂuence of ˆ αi on mB
i and mB
−i can be





[1 + si][2λ − 1] + 2[1 + ˆ αi]
￿
mB
i (ˆ α) − mN
i (ˆ αN)
￿
4[2λ − 1][1 + ˆ αi]






[1 + si][2λ − 1] − 2[1 + ˆ αi]
￿
mB
i (ˆ α) − mN
i (ˆ αN)
￿
4[2λ − 1][1 + ˆ αi]
2 [1 + si]
. (18)
In equilibrium, the median voter determines the election outcome. Setting ˆ αi = ¯ α
and inserting the above expressions for dmB
i /dˆ αi and dmB
−i/dˆ αi and (15) for mB
i (ˆ α)
and mB
−i(ˆ α) into equation (16), we obtain:
¯ α − ˆ αB
i











i (¯ α) is less than mU
i (¯ α) due to the presence of the externality which is
not internalized in the non-cooperative outcome and because mB
i (¯ α) = mU
i (¯ α), we
know that mB
i (¯ α) > mN
i (¯ α).15 Equation (19) then can only be satisﬁed if ˆ αB
i < ¯ α and
mB
i (ˆ αB) > mN
i (ˆ αN). The political outcome under cooperation thus entails strategic
delegation as before since the median voter chooses a representative with ˆ αB
i < ¯ α.
We can therefore conclude that:
Proposition 2 The number of refugees admitted under cooperation without transfer









i (¯ α) . (20)
The last result tells us that the strategic delegation eﬀect alone is not suﬃcient
to lower the equilibrium immigration levels to a level which is as ineﬃciently low as
the one prevailing in the non-cooperative outcome. The reason is that while in both
cases we do have strategic delegation, the positive net spill-overs are ignored under
the non-cooperative regime, but are internalized if cooperation is possible. From a
policy perspective, the implication is that the push towards increased coordination
15Note that this argument would hold even if there were no strategic delegation in the non-
cooperative game the of previous section.
14in the determination of asylum policy is desirable, even if we take account of the
democratic process through which the policy itself is determined.
In the following subsection, we analyze the extent to which coordination is de-
sirable, i.e. whether a further deepening of policy coordination is going to lead to
further welfare gains.
5.2 With Cost Sharing
We now extend the analysis by allowing countries to share the cost of the migration
policies. That is, we no longer assume that each country pays the costs of its own
refugees. Instead, the representatives bargain not only over immigration levels but
also over how to share the cost. In particular, we allow for a side-payment Z that
country 2 pays to country 1, or vice versa if Z is negative. As in the previous
subsection, we assume that the two representatives engage in Nash-bargaining. The
Nash-product now takes the form N = (s1 + Z)(s2 − Z). To maximize this Nash-
product with side payments, we proceed in two steps: ﬁrst, we derive the immigration
levels mS
i and mS
−i that maximize the aggregate bargaining surplus s1 + s2; second,
we determine ZS = [s2 − s1]/2, which divides the bargaining surplus equally between
the two countries.
The ﬁrst order conditions for mS
i and mS
−i take the following form:
2 + ˆ αi + ˆ α−i −
λ
1 − λmi − [1 − λ]m−i
−
1 − λ
1 − λm−i − [1 − λ]mi
= 0 . (21)
These equations are similar to the ones we derived for the utilitarian social optimum,
only that here we still have to determine the identity of the respective representatives.
As in the utilitarian optimum, both equations in (21) taken together imply that
mS
i = mS
−i. In particular, the immigration levels amount to:
m
S
i (ˆ α) = m
S
−i(ˆ α) =
1 + ˆ αi + ˆ α−i
2 + ˆ αi + ˆ α−i
. (22)














We can now analyze the ﬁrst stage of the game, in which elections take place.
Voters seek to maximize their utility imputation
Ui(αi,m
S,Z
S) = 2[1 + αi]m
S
i + ln(1 − m
S




i (ˆ α) is given by (22) and ZS = ZS(ˆ α,mS(ˆ α)) is given by (23). Solving
for the symmetric equilibrium, the ﬁrst order condition of the median voter’s problem
can be written as follows:
¯ α − ˆ αS
i
(1 + ˆ αS











As in the previous subsection, this result implies strategic delegation. Again, we
can see that the number of asylum seekers admitted by each country continues to
be ineﬃciently low, but higher than in the non-cooperative case. This implies that
some form of cooperation, whether with or without transfers between countries, is
desirable from the point of welfare maximization, even if explicitly account is taken of
the political process leading to the decision on the number of refugees to be admitted.
The question left to answer is how the outcome with side-payments compares to
the case in which countries are not allowed to carry out side-payments. Inserting
mi = [1 + 2ˆ αi]/[2 + 2ˆ αi] into (19) and (25) and rearranging yields:
¯ α − ˆ αB
i
[1 + ˆ αB
i ]{1 + 2ˆ αB






¯ α − ˆ αS
i
[1 + ˆ αS
i ]{1 + 2ˆ αS
i − 2[1 + ˆ αS
i ]mN(ˆ αN)}
= 1 . (27)
It is easy to show that the left-hand side of both equations decreases in ˆ αi. Since si
is positive, this implies that ˆ αB
i > ˆ αS
i . In other words, strategic delegation with side
payments is more pronounced than in the case without side payments. The reason is
that strategic delegation is now aimed at a more eﬃcient transfer mechanism — side-
payments — instead of misusing the migration decision as a transfer mechanism and
16thereby incurring eﬃciency losses as in the previous subsection.16 We can summarize
our results as follows:
Proposition 3 Coordination in the determination of policy towards refugees is de-
sirable, but coordination with side payments between countries turns out to be less












i (¯ α) . (28)
In other words, either form of coordination is better than the non-cooperative out-
come because coordination leads to the internalization of the cross-country spill-overs.
Comparing diﬀerent degrees of coordination, we see that less is more: The outcome
without side-payments is more eﬃcient than the result with cost sharing because the
strategic delegation eﬀect is not as severe.17 It is still present, however, so that even
coordination without side-payments does not achieve the ﬁrst best outcome.
6 Asymmetric Countries
So far we have considered the case of two symmetric countries. In reality, countries
are heterogenous and it is natural to ask to what extent the main results of our
analysis carry over even if we allow for diﬀerences between countries. Out of the
many possible forms of heterogeneity, we focus on diﬀerent average attitudes towards
asylum seekers. Without loss of generality, we assume that ¯ α2 > ¯ α1. To simplify
matters and maintain tractability, we limit the analysis to the case where only the
positive spill-overs of the warm glow apply (λ = 1). Individual utility then takes the
following form:
Ui(αi,m) = [1 + αi][mi + m−i] + ln(1 − mi) . (29)
16This result is reminiscent of Wilson (1990) who shows that the availability of a more eﬃcient
policy instrument can lead to a less eﬃcient equilibrium because the eﬃcient instrument is used
more extensively.
17One may wonder why the two countries would consider side-payments at all, since these turn
out to lead to a welfare inferior outcome. We are implicitly assuming that politicians cannot commit
to not use such payments. This assumption is supported by the fact that the use of side-payments
is a prominent feature of the current political debate.
17The utilitarian optimum now involves the following immigration levels:
m
U
1 (¯ α) = m
U
2 (¯ α) =
1 + ¯ α1 + ¯ α2
2 + ¯ α1 + ¯ α2
. (30)
Note that the optimum implies the same number of asylum seekers in both countries,
even though preferences diﬀer, because this allocation equalizes marginal costs.
Consider next the non-cooperative case without policy coordination. Proceeding
by backward induction, as before, we can derive the following immigation levels that
are chosen by the respective elected representative:
m
N
i (ˆ αi) =
ˆ αi
1 + ˆ αi
. (31)
In the election stage, the median voter chooses to represent the country herself (ˆ αi =
¯ αi) implying that in this context we do not see any strategic delegation.18 We have
therefore established the following series of inequalities:
m
N
1 (¯ α1) < m
N
2 (¯ α2) < m
U
i (¯ α) . (32)
In other words, the migration level in the less welcoming country is lower than in
the more supportive country. Furthermore, both levels fall short of the utilitarian
optimum. This implies an additional source of ineﬃciency as the marginal costs are
no longer equalized.
6.1 Policy Coordination without Cost Sharing
We now turn to the case of policy coordination but exclude for the time being the
possibility of cross-country transfers. As in Section 5.1, the two parties — by way of
Nash bargaining — seek to maximize N = s1·s2, where the surplus from coordination
now takes the form:
si = [1 + ˆ αi][m1 + m2] + ln(1 − mi) − Ui(ˆ αi,m
N(ˆ α
N)) . (33)
18This is due to our simplifying assumption of λ = 1, not to the asymmetry.
18The corresponding ﬁrst order conditions are:
￿




s−i + [1 + ˆ α−i]si = 0 . (34)
From these ﬁrst order conditions we can derive (see the appendix for the derivation)
the eﬀect of a marginal change in the identity of the representative (ˆ αi) on the policies
(mB
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si [1 − mB
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[1 + ˆ αi] − [1 + ˆ αi]∆mB)
si [1 − mB
i ]
2 | H |
. (36)
where ∆mB = (mB
1 − mN
1 ) + (mB
2 − mN
2 ) and the determinant | H |> 0. Turning to
the election stage, the ﬁrst order condition of the median voter in country i takes the
following form:
















Inserting from (35) and (36) yields
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(si − [1 + ¯ αi]∆m
B) +
￿







It follows from the above equations, that ˆ αB
1 6= ˆ αB
2 . To see this suppose they were
the same. Then the right hand side of the two equations would be the same, but not
the left hand side, which is a contradiction. Under standard stability assumptions,
it can further be shown that ˆ α2 > ˆ α1, which is intuitively plausible. It follows that
mB
1 (ˆ αB) 6= mB
2 (ˆ αB). Note the signiﬁcance of this result, as it implies that similarly
to the non-cooperative case the allocation of asylum seekers is asymmetric and hence
ineﬃcient because marginal costs diﬀer.
In addition, it follows from (38) that if ˆ αB
i and ˆ αB
−i are suﬃcently close together
(i.e. |ˆ αi − ˆ α−i| is suﬃciently small) we again have strategic delegation, that is, a
representative with a lower preference for immigration than the median. This result
of our symmetric model thus carries over to the asymmetric case — as long as the
19countries are not too diﬀerent.
6.2 Policy Coordination with Cost Sharing
Finally, we consider the situation where side-payments are possible. Solving back-
wards, the solution of the second stage has to maximize
P




i (ˆ α) =
1 + ˆ α1 + ˆ α2
2 + ˆ α1 + ˆ α2
. (39)
From this it follows that mS
1(ˆ α) = mS
2(ˆ α), i.e. marginal costs are equalized which
means that transfers are eﬀective at eliminating the ineﬃciency pointed out above.
We thus see that in the asymmetric case the possibility of side-payments also has
a beneﬁcial, eﬃciency enhancing role that mitigates its adverse eﬀect on strategic




[ˆ α2 − ˆ α1]∆mS + ln(1 − mN




where ∆mS = (mS
1 − mN
1 ) + (mS
2 − mN
2 ). Note that the transfer increases in the
diﬀerence between the two representatives’ preferences for immigration. Following
the same procedure as before, we can derive the following equilibium condition for
the election stage of the model:
2
￿
¯ αi − ˆ αS
i
￿
[2 + ˆ αS






This condition is equivalent to the corresponding condition in the symmetric case.
We see from (41) that, measured by the diﬀerence between ¯ αi and ˆ αi, the degree of
strategic delegation is the same for both countries. Clearly then, the representative
of country 2 has a higher preference for immigration than his counterpart in country
1. Furthermore, we see from (40) that the side-payment is positive, i.e. country 2
pays country 1 to accept more asylum seekers.
207 Conclusion
While opinion polls show that EU citizens prefer their countries to retain national
immigration policies, many political observers have argued in favor of policy coordi-
nation, especially where asylum seekers are concerned. On the one hand, the ever in-
creasing restrictiveness of national EU policies has prompted authors like Noll (2000)
to demand that a ‘race to the bottom’ be avoided. On the other, Hatton (2004)
and Hatton and Williamson (2004) advance the argument that EU citizens share an
altruistic attitude towards ‘real’ refugees. As a consequence, coordination is called
for in order to internalize inter-jurisdictional spill-overs. Others have gone a step
further and suggested even deeper coordination in the form of monetary cost sharing
to compensate those members that are particularly popular destinations for refugees.
In this paper, we model policy towards asylum seekers and refugees along public
good lines. However, whereas previous work has focused on welfare maximizing ar-
guments, we move beyond the perspective of a benevolent social planner and focus
on the democratic process that determines policy. Comparing the non-cooperative,
decentralized outcome to cases of diﬀering degrees of coordination, interesting results
emerge. On the one hand, coordination is desirable, even when we take into account
the political process, since it leads to an internalization of the inter-jurisdictional
spill-overs. On the other, when comparing diﬀerent degrees of coordination, we show
that cost sharing in the form of monetary transfers across countries can make mat-
ters worse. In fact, while coordination with transfers is still better than the non-
cooperative outcome, it is dominated in the symmetric setup by the lesser form of
coordination without such side-payments. The availability of side payments exacer-
bates the strategic delegation eﬀect and leads countries to accept an ineﬃciently low
number of refugees. This result suggests that caution is in order when considering the
coordination of policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. While some degree of
cooperation is desirable, excessive coordination that involves cost sharing can be less
eﬃcient. Even though our model is tailored to ﬁt the case of involuntarily displaced
individuals, the argument is clearly applicable to more general settings. As long as
workplace regulations are imperfectly enforced and immigrants in the EU common
21market give rise to cross-country spill-overs, a similar argument can be made against
‘excessive’ coordination of migration policy.
To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the ﬁrst to rigorously model
the political determination of asylum policies. As such, it employs a number of sim-
plifying assumptions that could be relaxed. By introducing asymmetric preferences
towards asylum seekers we take a ﬁrst step in this direction. Allowing for additional
asymmetries could be important in assessing the more general eﬀects of policy coor-
dination. Similarly, explicitly modelling more than two countries would allow us to
achieve a better understanding of the dynamics aspects of the formation of coalitions
in the bargaining game. While these are clearly very interesting questions, we leave
them for further research.
8 Appendix
8.1 Symmetric Case
This appendix derives dmB
i /dˆ αi and dmB
−i/dˆ αi for the bargaining equilibrium without
side-payments. The ﬁrst-order condition for mB
i as given by (14) is Nmi = 0. The
ﬁrst-order condition for mB













−Nm−iˆ αiNmimi + Nmiˆ αiNm−imi
NmimiNm−im−i − Nmim−iNm−imi
. (43)
22Departing from the symmetric equilibrium (ˆ αi = ˆ α−i and si = s−i), the respective
terms in (42) and (43) can be derived as
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2￿
+ [1 − 2λ]
2￿
= Nm−im−i , (44)
Nmim−i = −2[1 + ˆ αi]
2 ￿
4siλ[1 − λ] − [1 − 2λ]
2￿
= Nm−imi , (45)

























[1 + si][2λ − 1] + 2[1 + ˆ αi]
￿
mB
i (ˆ α) − mN
i (ˆ αN)
￿
4[2λ − 1][1 + ˆ αi]






[1 + si][2λ − 1] − 2[1 + ˆ αi]
￿
mB
i (ˆ α) − mN
i (ˆ αN)
￿
4[2λ − 1][1 + ˆ αi]
2 [1 + si]
. (49)
8.2 Asymmetric Case
As in the symmetric case, the equations determining the marginal inﬂuence of ˆ αi on
the immigration levels can be derived from the ﬁrst order conditions and are identical
to equations (42) and (43) above, with Nmi = 0 given by equation (34). From (34)




2 − 2[1 + ˆ α−i]
2 si/s−i , (50)




2 − 2[1 + ˆ αi]
2 s−i/si , (52)
Nmiˆ αi = s−i + [1 + ˆ α−i]∆m
B , (53)
Nm−iˆ αi = s−i − [1 + ˆ αi]∆m
Bs−i/si . (54)
Inserting these equations, employing (34), and rearranging yields (35) and (36), with
| H |≡ NmimiNm−im−i − Nmim−iNm−imi > 0.
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